I conducted a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to recognize prospective security and personal privacy issues.
I've discussed DeepSeek previously here.
Additional security and personal privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.
See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek
The findings detailed in this report are based simply on fixed analysis. This means that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive evidence that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants analysis, specifically provided the growing concerns around information privacy, security, the possible abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between worldwide powers.
Key Findings
Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration
- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising concerns about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app the other day too.
- Bespoke file encryption and data obfuscation approaches are present, with signs that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user .
- The app contains hard-coded public keys, instead of counting on the user gadget's chain of trust.
- UI interaction tracking captures detailed user habits without clear approval.
- WebView manipulation exists, which could enable the app to gain access to personal external web browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
A substantial part of the evaluated code appears to focus on gathering device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
- The app collects numerous special device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details. - System properties, set up bundles, and root detection systems suggest possible anti-tampering procedures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security scientists use to root their Android devices.
- Geolocation and network profiling exist, bphomesteading.com suggesting potential tracking capabilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting routines by area.
- Hardcoded device design lists suggest the application might act in a different way depending upon the found hardware.
- Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to draw out additional device details. E.g. if it can not figure out the gadget through standard Android SIM lookup (because consent was not approved), it attempts manufacturer specific extensions to access the exact same details.
Potential Malware-Like Behavior
While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, several observed behaviors align with known spyware and malware patterns:
- The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which might facilitate unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks. - SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unidentified purposes.
- The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible surveillance systems.
- The app executes calls to fill Dex modules, where extra code is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime.
- The.so files themselves reverse and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to load additional.so files. This center is not usually examined by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
- The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. The use of native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the complete degree of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly escalate benefits, possibly making use of vulnerabilities within the operating system or device hardware.
Remarks
While data collection prevails in modern-day applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises substantial privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a valid email, which must currently provide sufficient authentication. There is no valid factor for the app to strongly collect and transfer special gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
The degree of tracking observed here exceeds typical analytics practices, possibly allowing relentless user tracking and re-identification throughout gadgets. These habits, integrated with obfuscation techniques and network interaction with third-party tracking services, warrant a higher level of scrutiny from security scientists and users alike.
The work of runtime code loading as well as the bundling of native code suggests that the app might enable the release and execution of unreviewed, remotely provided code. This is a severe potential attack vector. No evidence in this report exists that from another location released code execution is being done, only that the facility for [users.atw.hu](http://users.atw.hu/samp-info-forum/index.php?PHPSESSID=8710adb7a736dbec4772d5d5d0dbf6a9&action=profile