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I performed a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to recognize potential security and personal privacy problems.

I've blogged about DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and personal privacy issues about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on static analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive proof that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants examination, particularly offered the growing issues around data personal privacy, security, the potential abuse of AI -driven applications, and cyber-espionage characteristics in between international powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure identifies these in the iPhone app the other day also.

Bespoke file encryption and data obfuscation techniques are present, with indicators that they might be used to exfiltrate user details.
The app contains hard-coded public keys, instead of counting on the user gadget's chain of trust.
UI interaction tracking catches detailed user habits without clear permission. - WebView control exists, which might enable the app to gain access to private external web browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here

Device Fingerprinting & Tracking

A substantial portion of the evaluated code appears to concentrate on event device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.

- The app gathers numerous special device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details.
System homes, installed plans, and root detection mechanisms suggest potential anti-tampering steps. E.g. probes for the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security researchers use to root their Android gadgets. - Geolocation and network profiling are present, showing possible tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by region. - Hardcoded device design lists suggest the application might act differently depending upon the spotted hardware.
Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out extra gadget details. E.g. if it can not figure out the gadget through basic Android SIM lookup (because approval was not given), it attempts manufacturer particular extensions to access the very same details.

Potential Malware-Like Behavior

While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, several observed habits align with known spyware and malware patterns:

- The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which might help with unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
SIM card details, serial numbers, asteroidsathome.net and other device-specific data are aggregated for unidentified purposes.
The app carries out country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible security mechanisms.
The app executes calls to fill Dex modules, where extra code is packed from files with a.so extension at runtime.
The.so submits themselves reverse and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to pack additional.so files. This center is not usually inspected by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
The.so files can be executed in native code, photorum.eclat-mauve.fr such as C++. Using native code includes a layer of complexity to the and obscures the full degree of the app's abilities. Moreover, cadizpedia.wikanda.es native code can be leveraged to more easily intensify advantages, akropolistravel.com potentially exploiting vulnerabilities within the os or gadget hardware.

Remarks

While data collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a legitimate email, which should currently offer sufficient authentication. There is no legitimate factor for the app to aggressively collect and transmit special device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.

The extent of tracking observed here surpasses normal analytics practices, possibly allowing consistent user tracking and re-identification across devices. These habits, bphomesteading.com integrated with obfuscation methods and network interaction with third-party tracking services, warrant a greater level of analysis from security scientists and users alike.

The employment of runtime code filling in addition to the bundling of native code suggests that the app might allow the release and execution of unreviewed, remotely provided code. This is a serious possible attack vector. No proof in this report exists that from another location released code execution is being done, only that the center for this appears present.

Additionally, the app's technique to discovering rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material protection are vital, or in competitive computer game to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such rigorous steps in an application of this nature, raising further concerns about its intent.

Users and companies considering installing DeepSeek needs to be conscious of these prospective risks. If this application is being used within a business or government environment, additional vetting and security controls ought to be enforced before enabling its release on managed gadgets.

Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based on static code evaluation and does not imply that all detected functions are actively used. Further examination is needed for wiki.rolandradio.net definitive conclusions.